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Between	the	mid-1990s	and	the	early	part	of	the	new	century,	the	total	fertility	rate	in	Eritrea	declined	by	twenty	one	percent.	Even	more	striking	than	
the	magnitude	of	this	decline	within	a	short	period	is	that	it	occurred	in	the	absence	of	any	improvements	in	contraceptive	use	and	without	any	evident	
reduction	in	desired	family	size.	In	this	study,	fertility	decline	and	its	underlying	factors	are	examined	using	data	from	two	waves	of	the	Eritrea	Demo-
graphic	and	Health	Surveys.	The	central	question	is	whether	the	recent	decline	is	an	outcome	of	the	1998–2000	border	conflict,	is	related	to	changes	
in	women’s	reproductive	intentions,	or	is	due	to	socio-economic	transformations.	The	findings	demonstrate	that	the	fertility	decline,	especially	for	first	
births,	is	the	result	less	of	increased	demand	for	family	size	limitation	and	more	of	the	border	conflict.	Although	the	conflict	seems	to	have	played	a	role	
in	accelerating	the	decline	in	higher-order	births,	the	change	seems	to	be	a	long-term	transition	that	started	before	the	conflict.	These	findings	imply	that	
military	conflicts	are	unlikely	to	instigate	sustainable	fertility	decline,	but	may	prompt	short-term	fertility	changes	among	certain	groups	or	modify	an	
ongoing	decline.
Declining Fertility in Eritrea Since the Mid-1990s:  
A Demographic Response to Military Conflict
Gebremariam	Woldemicael,	Department	of	Sociology	(Population	Studies	Center),	University	of	Western	Ontario,	
London	Ontario,	Canada
Until the late 1980s, the a woman in sub-Saharan Africa 
had six children in her lifetime, which was higher than 
the average in any other region in the world. During the 
1990s, fertility started to decline in most sub-Saharan 
African countries, marking the beginning of a trend to 
smaller family size preferences in the region (USAID 
2003). Reduction in under-five mortality rates, a rise in 
use of modern contraceptives, and an increase in age at 
first marriage are suggested as the major factors associated 
with fertility decline (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2001). In the 
Horn of Africa, Eritrean fertility rates declined consid-
erably during a period of border conflict with Ethiopia 
(1998–2000). According to the Eritrea Demography and 
Health Survey (EDHS), total fertility rate (TFR) declined 
from 6.1 in 1995 to 4.8 in 2002, implying a reduction in pe-
riod fertility of 21 percent over a period of about six years 
(NSEO and ORC Macro 2003). 
The fertility decline in Eritrea has generated much interest 
in academic and other concerned circles, arising from a be-
lief that Eritrea has witnessed a remarkable reduction in fer-
tility rates despite largely lacking the improvements in fam-
ily planning and standards of living frequently associated 
with demographic transition. Increases in contraceptive use 
and induced abortion, relatively late age at marriage, as well 
as long periods of post-partum sexual abstinence and post-
partum amenorrhea can substantially reduce fertility from 
its natural maximum (Bongaarts and Potter 1983). However, 
with the exception of age at first marriage and the propor-
tion of women never married, the proximate variables 
have not changed sufficiently since 1995 to account for the 
observed declines in fertility. For instance, the rate of use of 
any contraceptive practice remained constant at 8 percent 
between 1995 and 2002. In the case of postpartum variables, 
the median duration of postpartum abstinence remained 
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roughly the same (2.7 months in 1995 and 3.0 months in 
2002) (NSEO and ORC Macro 2003). And median duration 
of insusceptibility changed in a manner that would lead to 
an increase in fertility, falling from 16.6 months in 1995 to 
14.6 months in 2002. Changes in the duration of sexual ab-
stinence and postpartum insusceptibility are, therefore, not 
likely to be important factors for the recent fertility decline. 
The median age at first marriage among women aged 20–49 
increased slightly from 16.8 in 1995 to 17.7 years in 2002. 
In Eritrea, statistics on abortion are scarce and unreliable 
because abortion is illegal unless it is intended to save the 
mother’s life. It is, therefore, difficult to know how prevalent 
induced abortion is in Eritrea and what contribution it may 
have made to the recent decline.
 
Even though there were some improvements in education, 
health services, and economic status between 1993 and 1997, 
it cannot be said that progress continued after 1998. Instead, 
Eritrea experienced severe economic difficulties, high infla-
tion, population displacement and migration, and military 
mobilization caused by the 1998–2000 border conflict. 
Although the country has had relative peace since 2000, 
it has suffered from considerable crisis-induced hardships 
because of military tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
which remain unresolved.
Conventional demographic transition theory predicts that 
a decline in actual fertility should lag behind decline in 
desire for more children or in ideal family size. Several 
classical cases of fertility transition show that as a country 
develops, the cost of rearing children rises and benefits 
from having them fall, thus leading couples to want smaller 
families (Bulatao and Casterline 2001). To implement these 
preferences, couples use contraception, which in turn leads 
to lower actual fertility. However, empirical evidence on 
fertility decline has not always been consistent. It is argued 
that fertility decline may occur without any evident reduc-
tion in desired family size as fertility and fertility desires 
can be influenced by other non-conventional factors such 
as war or economic and political crises (Agadjanian and 
Ndola 2002). 
The rapid decline in fertility in Eritrea demands investiga-
tion: is the decline an outcome of the border conflict or 
due to changes in women’s reproductive intentions, caused 
by other factors. The key questions are: How does fertility 
respond to such war and socio-economic crisis? Can we say 
that the border conflict initiated or accelerated the decline, 
producing a negative correlation between socio-economic 
factors and family limitation as opposed to the positive 
correlation associated with classical demographic theory? 
Or does the recent decline in fertility stem from changes in 
women’s demand for large families, with conflict and eco-
nomic decline neutral in effect? Answers to these questions 
may have important implications for theories of fertility 
change and for population programs in the country. More 
importantly, the fertility response to the border conflict 
may have practical consequences for future population 
growth in Eritrea. 
Despite such important theoretical and policy implica-
tions, there are only two studies of the nature and cause 
of changes in Eritrean fertility (Blanc 2004; Woldemicael 
2008). Using Bongaarts model, Blanc concluded that the 
recent fertility decline is mainly an outcome of the border 
conflict mediated by a reduction in the proportion of 
women exposed to the risk of pregnancy (as a consequence 
of delayed age at marriage and spousal separation). How-
ever, it is not clear whether such effects are evident when 
other more specific factors such as region of residence, 
child survival status, historical period, and other socio-
economic factors are examined using multivariate models. 
Using both trend and multivariate analyses, Woldemicael 
(2008) shows that the fertility decline is partly due to the 
impact of the border conflict and partly due to the socio-
economic transformation pre-dating the conflict. How-
ever, although both studies provide some understanding 
of the impact of the border conflict on the recent fertility 
decline, several important questions remain unaddressed, 
including the role of reproductive preferences, spousal 
separation, and adolescent childbearing in the fertility 
decline.
The present study extends my previous work in three im-
portant ways: First, an important unresolved issue concerns 
whether changes in reproductive behavior favoring smaller 
families (i.e., the proportion of women who want no more 
children) occurred in Eritrea during the inter-survey period 
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(1995–2002), and if so, what do these changes in reproduc-
tive preferences suggest about the recent fertility decline? 
Classical demographic transition theory understands fertil-
ity decline as a direct consequence of a decreased desire for 
live births. This decreased desire or demand for children is 
viewed as a response to improved child survival and a result 
of structural changes in society that reduce the benefits 
and increase the costs of rearing children (Davis 1963; 
Hirschman 1994). Other factors, such as military conflict or 
economic decline, can also lead to low demand for children 
and crisis-led transition in fertility intentions (Hill 2004). 
Second, a trend analysis examines whether adolescent 
childbearing and age at first marriage changed during the 
conflict period and assesses their relative contribution to 
the decline. Here, we consider fertility as a potentially im-
portant demographic mechanism through which individu-
als adjust to changes in their environment. Conventional 
demographic wisdom suggests that in societies like Eritrea, 
where childbearing and marriage are closely related, the 
postponement of the onset of childbearing would typi-
cally be achieved by delaying marriage (Caldwell 2004). 
Caldwell argues that entry into marriage is an important 
path of adjustment; I examine its dynamics in Eritrea. The 
third important question of interest in this study is whether 
spousal separation changed during the conflict period and 
whether this factor contributed to the recent decline.
1. The Background in Eritrea
Eritrea is one of the least developed countries in the world 
with per capita income of about $130 and a Human Devel-
opment Index ranking of 156 out of 177 countries (Advisory 
Panel on Country Information 2007). Maternal and child 
mortality are still high: about 600 maternal deaths per 
100,000 live births and more than 50 infant deaths per 1000 
live births. More than 60 percent of households have no 
access to safe drinking water (NSEO and ORC Macro 2003). 
About 39 percent of males and 52 percent of females have 
never attended school. The male-female gap in education 
is still large and most evident at higher levels of education. 
The country is still characterized by high fertility levels, 
although they have started to decline. 
The country has been in a state of war with Ethiopia for 
the past five decades or more. The thirty-year struggle for 
independence (1961–91) and subsequently the 1998–2000 
border conflict both had significant socio-economic and 
demographic impacts on the country. Statistical indica-
tors on socio-economic trends are very limited and those 
that are available are largely unreliable, as there is very 
little transparency from the side of the government. The 
few statistics that are available indicate a negative trend in 
economic performance and per-capital GDP declining since 
the outbreak of the border conflict (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2008; Healy 2007). Before the border conflict, the Eritrean 
economy grew by an average of 7 percent annually between 
1994 and 1997. Following the outbreak of war in 1998, GDP 
growth declined to 4 percent in 1998 and 3 percent in 1999; 
the economy contracted by 9 percent in 2000 (Alamin 
2003). The border conflict devastated the subsistence agri-
cultural sector, on which 80 percent of the population rely, 
with food production reduced by 62 percent. The delayed 
demobilization of agriculturalists from military service 
kept agricultural production well below normal, holding 
down growth in 2002–2006 (Advisory Panel on Country 
Information 2007). 
The war of liberation and the recent border conflict both 
had serious repercussions on the country’s demographic 
situation as well. Military mobilization, loss of life, and 
wartime migration have created several unusual features 
in the population structure, distorted the population pyra-
mid, and skewed sex ratios. For instance, the average ratio 
of males to females in rural Eritrea during the struggle 
for liberation has been estimated at 47 to 53 (Community 
Development Services 1991). This imbalance in the ratio 
of men to women, caused mainly by male losses in the 
liberation struggle, has led to labor shortages, particularly 
in the agricultural sector (Green and Baden 1994). The 
population pyramid in Figure 1 is also a clear testimony 
of the impact of the 1998–2000 border conflict on the age 
structure of the population. The pyramid is characterized 
by a broad base and a striking deficit of adults, especially 
men. The male deficit is mainly between ages 20–54 and 
to a lesser extent at ages 15–19 and above 55 years. The 
observed male deficit can be attributed to endless mili-
tary service, forced conscription, and a mass exodus of 
youth to neighboring countries and much further afield. 
Conscription is compulsory for all male and unmarried 
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female Eritreans aged 18–45 years. Figure 1 also shows that 
the proportion of the population aged 0–4 is smaller than 
the proportion aged 5–9, suggesting that there were fewer 
births during the period of conflict. This age group would 
have been broader if there had been more married couples 
living together.
Figure 1: Population pyramid of Eritrea, 2002
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Source:	National	Statistics	Office	&	ORC	Macro	Inc.	2003.	2002	Demographic	and	Health	Survey	Report
The impact of the conflict is also reflected in high propor-
tions of female-headed households and increased spousal 
separation, factors that are important for fertility change. 
The EDHS reports show that the proportion of households 
headed by females increased from 31 percent in 1995 to 
47 percent in 2002. Military mobilization for the border 
conflict also decreased the proportion of married couples 
living together. A comparison of the proportions of married 
women residing with their husbands at the time of the 1995 
and 2002 EDHS surveys shows a significant decline in all 
age groups (see Table 1) and particularly at younger ages. 
For instance, the proportion of married women aged 15–19 
who were living with their husband in 2002 is about 50 
percent lower than it was in 1995. Moreover, only four in ten 
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married women aged 20–24 were living with their husband 
in 2002, while the corresponding figure in 1995 was more 
than seven in ten. Separation reduces married women’s 
exposure to the risk of pregnancy. A review of fertility 
response to war and population displacement of women 
in Sarajevo before and during the Bosnian war in 1992–94 
shows that in the short-term fertility fell mainly as a result 
of temporary separation of couples (Hill 2004).
Table 1:  Percent ever married and percent of married women 
residing with husband by age, 1995 and 2002
Current	age Ever	married Residing	with	husband
1995 2002 1995 2002
15-19 37.6 31.0 60.4 30.5
20-24 78.1 72.7 74.4 42.1
25-29 92.1 88.5 79.1 48.9
30-34 95.8 95.4 84.0 60.6
35-39 98.2 97.8 88.4 72.4
40-44 97.3 99.0 89.0 78.9
45-49 98.1 99.2 90.6 88.0
Total 80.0 76.7 80.9 58.5
The	figures	are	calculated	from	the	1995	and	2002	EDHS	data	files
War can also lead to conscious adjustments in fertility 
behavior because couples are more likely to opt to avoid 
births during troubled times (CEPED 1998). We expect that 
in countries like Eritrea, military tensions and the uncer-
tainty of peace will depress the desire for fertility and as a 
result fertility may decline. Such fertility responses to war 
are indeed described in some studies, where fertility falls 
because the stress and uncertainties in people’s lives are 
not conducive to childbearing (Lindstrom and Berhanu 
1999; McGinn 2000). Thus, although the data used in this 
study do not allow any examination of the duration of war-
induced change in fertility behavior, the war is likely to have 
had some impact on fertility behavior. In addition, cultural 
values or traditions of a society may affect fertility behavior, 
where traditional societies favor large families and non-
traditional societies prefer small families. 
2. Data and Variables
The data for this study come from two Eritrea Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys conducted in 1995 and 2002. 
Both surveys are nationally representative of households. 
Each survey collected information on the characteristics of 
selected households and from all women of reproductive 
age (age 15–49). Information on fertility, fertility intentions, 
contraception, maternal and child health, and other related 
issues was collected from 5,054 women of reproductive age 
in 1995 and 8,754 women of the same age in 2002.
Criteria including timing of the fertility decline and 
regional/provincial response differentials were used to 
examine the hypothesis that the decline is an outcome of 
the border conflict. The rationale for using each criterion is 
given below.
Timing of the fertility decline: Even though there is no 
established timeframe for examining a fertility response 
to military conflict or economic decline, the expectation is 
that it would occur over a relatively short period depending 
upon the nature, extent, and severity of the crisis (Ashton 
et al. 1984). Palloni, Hill, and Pinto (1996) show that the 
impact of economic shock on fertility becomes apparent 
within one or two years after the onset of the crisis and con-
clude that the strength of impact depends on the magnitude 
and duration of crisis. Thus, the characteristic of a crisis-led 
decline is that fertility change closely follows rather than 
precedes crisis. Annual TFRs were estimated and plot-
ted over a period of one decade preceding the survey to 
precisely establish the timing of fertility change in relation 
to the onset of conflict in the country. Plotting the annual 
fertility estimates shows visually whether a fertility decline 
occurred after the onset of conflict in 1998. Age-specific 
fertility rates (ASFRs) were also estimated to examine how 
the trend varies by age.
The timing of the fertility decline was also be assessed using 
multivariate statistical analysis, specifically a Cox regression 
model. The simpler strategy of measuring crisis in terms 
of a historical period was adopted. This meant, however, 
that it was not possible to identify the specific crisis factors 
responsible for the change (changes in GDP, inflation rates, 
etc.). Thus, historical period is the key proximate indicator of 
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conflict in this study and is measured by a categorical vari-
able, defined as before 1990, 1990–92, 1993–95, 1996–98, and 
1999–2001: this grouping reflects the past political and eco-
nomic situation of the country. The period before 1990 and 
1990–92 were the time of the liberation struggle and prepa-
ration for the independence referendum, 1993–98 was the 
post-independence period where some progress was made 
in education, health services, and other infrastructure, while 
the last period was a time of military mobilization, mass 
displacement, and economic decline caused by the border 
conflict which started in mid-1998. The analysis recognizes 
1999 as the starting year of social disruption and economic 
decline due to the conflict. Thus, in the multivariate analysis, 
the relative  probabilities attached to the different categories 
of historical period indicate how much fertility changed dur-
ing the crisis period in comparison with the peace period, 
especially with the reference category (1996–98). 
Regional response differentials: If crisis is responsible for 
initiating the fertility decline, then this decline should be 
most pronounced among populations with the most severe 
experience of conflict. Although all regions of the country 
were affected by the border conflict, two regions—Southern 
and Gash Barka—were worst hit. Thousands of residents 
of these regions were displaced. Thus, one would expect 
a stronger fertility response in these regions. Interaction 
terms between historical period and region of residence 
were introduced in a multivariate model to test the hypoth-
esis that fertility responses differ between regions. 
Spousal separation was also included as a proxy indicator 
of the war effect. As described above, the border conflict 
resulted in general military mobilization, especially of 
males aged 18–45. It is likely that such separation will have 
reduced married women’s exposure to the risk of pregnan-
cy. However, note that because this variable was measured 
on the interview date it may not capture the full effect of 
war-related separation on fertility, due to the cross-sectional 
nature of the data, and because information on the exact 
timing of spousal separation is not available; we are thus 
unable to use duration of spousal separation.
In addition to the independent variables outlined above, we 
included other demographic and socio-economic variables 
as control variables. These include age at birth of previ-
ous child, age at first marriage, birth order, previous birth 
interval, and survival status of previous child. Background 
socio-economic variables include education and childhood 
residence (rural/urban).
Unfortunately, we were unable to take into account 
numerous other factors that influence fertility directly or 
indirectly. Probably one of the most important is HIV/
AIDS. Some researchers argue that severe HIV epidem-
ics are likely to exert to downward pressure on fertility 
(Gregson 1994). Using the Demographic Health Survey of 
Tanzania, Baschieri (2000) found a greater impact of HIV/
AIDS in the higher-prevalence zones (fertility was three 
to five percent lower than it would be in the absence of 
HIV/AIDS) than in the lower-prevalence zones (where the 
impact was less than two percent). An HIV/AIDS epi-
demic can affect fertility in several ways (Mturi and Hinde 
2001): First, men and women with HIV/AIDS may reduce 
fecundity for a variety of reasons (including reduced 
coital frequency). Second, age-selective AIDS mortality 
may reduce the population capable of giving birth, since 
most deaths from AIDS occur in the childbearing ages. 
Finally, an HIV/AIDS epidemic can give rise to greater use 
of contraceptives (especially condoms) which may lead to 
reduced fertility. Since no detailed information on HIV/
AIDS is available in Eritrea, we could not consider this 
variable in our analyses.
3. Results 
3.1. Fertility Trends in Eritrea
To give some idea of the fertility trends in Eritrea, total 
fertility rate (TFR) and age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) are 
presented in Figures 2 through 4. Eritrea is at the earliest 
stage of fertility transition and has an intermediate level 
of fertility (a TFR of about 5). The TFR was around seven 
children per woman during the mid-1990s (see Figure 2). 
Since then it has begun to decrease, with relatively faster 
decline particularly after 1998. TFR declined from about 6.1 
children per woman in 1997/98 to 4.8 in 2001/02. So in about 
six years, TFR declined by about 1.3 children per woman (or 
21 percent). This finding is consistent with the results of the 
National Statistics and Evaluation Office (NSEO and ORC 
Macro 2003)
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To show the trend in fertility more clearly, fertility rates 
for five-year age groups were plotted for both surveys (see 
Figures 3 and 4). The age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) in 
Figure 3 show a broad peaked age pattern of fertility that 
falls slowly with advanced age. This is a characteristic of 
a population where there is little parity-specific fertility 
control. With the exception of the oldest age group (45–49), 
a decline in fertility over the period occurred in all age 
groups, although most of the fertility decline occurred 
among ages 20–30.
Figure 2: Total fertility rate, 1990–2001
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Figure 4 shows that the decline by age in rural areas follows 
the national trend, where the decline is most marked at ages 
30–34 and older. In urban areas, the decline is noticeable at 
ages 25–34 and 40–44. Regardless of age, fertility is lower in 
urban areas in both surveys, and the fertility gap between 
the two surveys is wider in rural areas, suggesting that the 
decline was stronger in rural areas. Couples’ changing at-
titudes toward desire to reproduce as children become more 
and more expensive (economic value is declining, more 
and more children going to school, increasing shortages in 
housing and other social facilities) are likely to affect fertil-
ity, particularly in the urban areas (Teller et al. 2007). 
Figure 3: Age-specific fertility rate per woman, 1995 and 2002
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3.2. Age at Start of Childbearing and Adolescent Fertility
Age at first marriage marks the beginning of the period of 
potential childbearing and is one of the most important 
determinants of fertility in societies like Eritrea, where 
premarital sex and birth out of wedlock are uncommon 
and stigmatized. Table 2 shows median age at first mar-
riage in Eritrea obtained from the 1995 and 2002 surveys. 
The data indicate an increase of about one year in median 
age at first marriage between 1995 and 2002. The data 
also show an increase in median age at first marriage in 
each age group, with smaller differences in younger age 
cohorts. This trend in age at first marriage suggests that 
war might have hastened fertility reduction by delaying 
marriage.
Figure 4: Urban and rural age-specific fertility rate per woman, 1995 and 2002
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Table 2: Median age at first marriage, 1995 and 2002
Age	
Median	age	at	first	marriage
1995 2002
20-24 16.7 17.1
25-29 17.3 18.0
30-34 17.3 17.8
35-39 16.8 18.8
40-44 16.5 18.8
45-49 16.3 17.8
All	ages 16.8 17.7
Table 3 presents data on the proportion of teenage women 
who became pregnant before age 20 in relation to selected 
variables. Overall, the data show that teenage childbearing 
in Eritrea declined from 23 percent in 1995 to 14 percent  
in 2002. Delayed childbearing among adolescent women  
is likely to lead to fertility decline. It is evident from  
this table that the proportion of teenage mothers rises 
steadily with age. As expected, there are differences by 
educational status in both survey years. The proportion  
of teenage childbearing among women with no education 
or just primary education is consistently higher than that 
of their better-educated counterparts. This finding is con-
sistent with evidence found elsewhere (Gupta and  
Leite 1999). In addition, urban teenagers are less likely 
to have ever given birth. Although teenage childbearing 
declined in rural areas and among less educated women, 
no such decline was observed among more educated 
women and urban teenagers. This finding deserves further 
investigation.
Table 3: Adolescent fertility: Percentage of adolescent women in category who have begun childbearing, 1995 and 2002
1995 2002
Age Percent Number Percent Number
15 	 3.0 	 303 	 2.1 	 426
16 	 13.4 	 217 	 2.8 	 424
17 	 21.6 	 190 	 8.0 	 326
18 	 40.4 	 275 	 24.0 	 545
19 	 50.7 	 144 	 36.4 	 280
Place	of	residence
Rural	 	 33.8 	 681 	 19.3 	 917
Urban 	 7.4 	 448 	 7.7 	 1084
Education
No	education 	 42.1 	 430 	 25.4 	 425
Primary 	 18.9 	 350 	 13.5 	 996
Secondary	or	higher 	 4.6 	 349 	 6.6 	 580
Total 	 23.3 	 1129 	 14.0 	 2001
3.3. Fertility Intentions
Earlier studies (e.g., Kulkarni and Choe 1998) indicate 
that unwanted fertility is very low or non-existent at the 
beginning of the transition process when fertility desires 
are mostly unrestricted and at the end when couples have 
nearly complete control over their fertility. In-between 
these two extremes, many couples would prefer a specific 
family size but do not control their fertility effectively and 
hence have unwanted births (Easterlin 1983; Bongaarts 
1997). Adetunji (2001) shows that the probability of having 
unwanted fertility is low in countries with TFR above 6 
and below 3 and high among those with a TFR in the range 
in-between. The low level of unwanted fertility at the start 
of transition when TFR is maximum and at the last phase 
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of transition when TFR is minimum on one hand, and the 
high level of unwanted fertility in the middle phase of the 
transition to lower fertility, on the other hand, demonstrate 
how the link between unwanted fertility and TFR exists 
during fertility transition. Thus, as fertility begins to de-
cline, we should expect to see an increase in the level of un-
wanted fertility, reflecting of a downward trend in fertility 
preference. However, until unwanted fertility reaches high 
levels, prospects for a lasting reduction in total fertility 
rate are small (Adetunji 2001). The key question here is: Do 
the findings from Eritrea show the expected trend? That 
is, does the level of unwanted fertility depend on where 
Eritrea is in the course of fertility transition? 
To answer these questions, first a comparison was made of 
wanted and unwanted fertility, which are the two compo-
nents of total fertility. As can be seen from Table 4, the TF 
shows a decline from 6.2 in 1995 to 4.9 in 2002. Similarly, 
the wanted total fertility declined substantially, from 5.8 to 
4.5 while the unwanted component remained constant at 
0.4 children per woman. All other things being equal, as 
countries move from high to low fertility levels, unwanted 
fertility levels tend to increase first unless efforts are made 
to reduce them and then decrease as fertility reaches the 
lower level (Adetunji 2001). However, contrary to expecta-
tions and previous research, unwanted fertility remained 
constant between the surveys. From these results, we can 
infer that if unwanted fertility had been prevented, the 
total fertility rate in 2002 would have declined by only 8 
percent (i.e., 4.5 births per woman rather than 4.9). Thus, 
had women in Eritrea used contraception to avoid their 
unwanted births, the reduction in overall fertility would 
not have been significant or would not account for the 
observed decline. 
Table 4 also presents the levels of wanted and unwanted 
fertility by urban/rural residence, education, and household 
economic status. Total fertility and total wanted fertility 
declined in both urban and rural areas, but the decline 
was much greater in rural areas. Wanted fertility in rural 
areas is more than double the figure for urban areas in both 
surveys, while there is no urban-rural difference in un-
wanted fertility. In terms of education, there are large and 
consistent differences in wanted fertility between the three 
groups, with uneducated women wanting more children 
than women with primary or secondary education. The pat-
tern for unwanted fertility is similar to that of wanted fertil-
ity. While in the later survey unwanted fertility decreases 
consistently as education increases, in the earlier survey it 
is higher among women with primary education than those 
with no education. It may be that in the earlier period many 
women with primary education would like fewer children 
but are not yet controlling their fertility effectively, thus 
leading to relatively high levels of unwanted fertility for this 
group. There is difference in unwanted fertility between 
women with low and medium household income, while 
those with high household economic status have the lowest 
unwanted fertility. It may be that women with higher eco-
nomic status are more likely to wish to lower their fertility 
and hence use contraception.
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To obtain further information on whether the desire to 
have no more children is related to the course of the overall 
fertility decline in Eritrea, women’s desire for more children 
was examined. Table 5 shows data on currently married 
women’s desire for children broken down by the number of 
living children. The overall proportion of women who want 
no more children is very low, and has remained constant at 
about 18 percent since 1995. Previous studies (e.g., Westoff 
and Bankole 2002) indicate that in sub-Saharan African 
countries that have experienced sustained fertility decline 
the proportion of women who want no more children is 
within the range of 30 to 50 percent. By comparison the 
proportion of Eritrean women wanting no more children is 
much lower. According to Westoff and Bankole, this would 
imply that Eritrea had not experienced a decline or was 
at the beginning of fertility transition, whereas in fact the 
country has experienced a remarkable decline in fertility. 
So, Westoff and Bankole’s thesis is not always consistent. 
Other factors, for instance, military conflict, economic 
downturn, and other abnormal situations can lead to low 
aspirations and crisis-led fertility transitions (Avogo and 
Agadjanian 2007; Hill 2004; Lindstrom and Berhanu 
1999). Table 5 also shows that the desire for another child is 
strongly related to the number of living children a woman 
has. As the number of living children increases, the propor-
tion of women who desire to have another child declines 
while the proportion of women who want no more children 
increases.
Table 4: Total marital fertility, wanted and unwanted marital fertility, and percentage unwanted, by residence and education, 1995 and 2002
1995 2002
Socioeconomic	factors TMF TWMF TUMF %	unwanted* TMF TWMF TUMF %	unwanted*
Residence
Urban 4.2 3.9 0.3 7.1 3.5 3.1 0.4 11.4
Rural 7.0 6.7 0.3 4.3 5.8 5.4 0.4 6.9
Education
No	education 6.8 6.5 0.3 4.4 5.9 5.4 0.5 8.5
Primary 6.1 5.6 0.5 8.2 4.1 3.7 0.4 9.8
Secondary+ 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.8 0.2 6.7
Household	economic	status
Low 6.5 6.1 0.4 6.2 6.0 5.5 0.5 8.3
Medium 6.0 5.6 0.4 6.7 5.0 4.5 0.5 10.0
High 3.4 3.4 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.8 0.2 6.7
Total 6.3 5.8 0.4 6.5 4.9 4.5 0.4 8.2
*	Calculated	as	TUMF/TMF*100.
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3.4. War-Related Variation in Eritrean Fertility 
So far we have used TFR and ASFR to assess the trends 
in fertility. But such measures do not capture the impact 
of changes in other factors contributing to family size 
limitation. Multivariate analyses including socio-demo-
graphic factors were used to control for compositional 
differences that may have contributed to the fertility 
decline. Analysis and interpretation of the associa-
tion between the explanatory variables and fertility was 
facilitated by estimation of separate models for first and 
higher-order births. We expected some variables, such as 
age at first marriage, to be more important for first births 
while others, such as age at birth of previous child, birth 
order, and previous birth interval, are only applicable for 
higher parities. Table 6 presents the multivariate results 
of first birth analysis. Two models are estimated. Model 
1 includes calendar year only and Model 2 adds other 
socio-demographic factors.
The relative probabilities associated with calendar years 
indicate how much fertility has changed relative to the 
reference period level (1996–98). Overall, Model 1 shows 
significantly lower fertility in the early 1990s and before, 
higher fertility between 1993 and 1998, and significantly 
lower fertility after 1998. Although it is difficult to estab-
lish a direct causal link between military conflict and 
fertility, the findings offer some evidence that the changes 
in fertility coincide with three major historical events 
in Eritrea: the thirty-year war of independence ending 
in 1992, the subsequent political stability and peace in 
1993–98, and the border conflict with Ethiopia starting 
in 1998. The lower fertility of first births during the early 
1990s may be seen as a response to economic decline and 
political instability caused by the war of independence. 
The specific demographic effects of conscription of young 
adults, separation of married couples due to forced migra-
tion and mass displacement, and intentional or uninten-
tional postponement of marriages and childbearing dur-
ing this period can only be guessed at, but it is clear that 
these factors can reduce fertility. The increase in fertility 
during 1993–98 could be a reflection of a boom in mar-
riages and births postponed during the war for liberation. 
This is consistent with studies of pre-industrial Europe 
(Hobcraft 1996), which indicate a sharp decline in fertility 
during war years with a rebound in post-war years. The 
subsequent fertility decline reflects the effect of the recent 
border conflict. Although the border conflict started in 
mid-1998, its effect can be observed in 1999 and after. Even 
after controlling for the socio-demographic factors, the ef-
fects of historical period remain almost the same and sta-
tistically significant. Thus, historical period exerts a strong 
and independent influence over fertility and this clearly 
suggests that a substantial part of the effect of historical 
period is channeled through other mechanisms.
Table 5: Percentage of currently married women who want additional children or no more children, by number of living children, 1995 and 2002
1995 2002
Number	of		
living	children
%	want		
another	child
%	want	no		
more	children
%	undecided %	infecund
%	want		
another	child
%	want	no		
more	children
%	undecided %	infecund
0 92.9 1.5 4.3 1.2 94.2 0.8 4.0 1.0
1 93.1 3.5 2.0 1.3 93.7 2.2 3.3 0.8
2 88.8 6.2 3.3 1.7 88.0 5.8 4.4 1.8
3 87.6 7.6 2.6 2.2 83.3 9.9 5.2 1.6
4 77.9 15.1 1.9 5.1 68.0 22.2 7.2 2.6
5 66.3 23.8 3.4 6.5 58.6 26.8 9.9 4.6
6 53.2 32.7 8.5 5.6 45.8 41.0 9.6 3.6
7+ 33.5 50.3 7.2 9.0 28.2 55.9 9.8 6.1
Total 73.7 18.1 4.1 4.1 73.8 17.6 6.2 2.5
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The results of Model 2 also show that most of the socio-
demographic factors are significantly associated with first 
birth fertility. As expected, age at marriage has a strong 
effect on first birth fertility, with women who married later 
(20 or older) being 75 percent less likely to have their first 
birth than women who married at 16 years or younger. First 
birth fertility is also lower among married women who are 
not living with their husbands. The probability of having a 
first birth is lower among women with secondary or higher 
education and those who reside in urban areas. The impact 
of region of residence seems to be contrary to our expecta-
tions. The two regions (Gash Barka and Southern) which 
are considered to be worst affected by the conflict do not 
show lower fertility compared with other regions. In fact, 
the Southern region has the highest fertility.
Table 7 displays the multivariate results for higher-order 
births. Unlike for first births (Table 6), the probability of a 
higher-order birth increases linearly up to 1995 and then falls 
significantly. Thus although the decline is accelerated after 
the border conflict (1999–2001), it already started sometime 
between 1996 and 1998. As with the results for first births, 
the effects of historical period on fertility of higher-order 
births are unchanged when the socio-demographic fac-
tors are held constant. Women whose husbands live away 
are 15 percent less likely to have a child than women whose 
husbands live with them. Lindstrom and Berhanu (1999) 
found spousal separation to be the main mechanism by 
which civil war affected fertility in Ethiopia. Fertility for 
higher-order births is more likely to be lower among older 
women (35 or older) than among younger women. A decline 
in fertility is also observed at higher birth orders (four 
and above). The survival status of the previous child has a 
significant effect on fertility, where fertility is higher if the 
preceding child dies than it survives until the conception of 
the next birth. The probability of having a higher-order birth 
decreases significantly with increasing birth interval. The 
effects of urban/rural childhood residence and education 
are in the expected direction and statistically significant, 
where fertility is lower among women with some education 
and among those who grew up in urban areas. Fertility of 
higher-order births is significantly lower in Northern Red 
Sea and Gash Barka regions than in other regions. The lower 
fertility in Gash Barka region may be a response to the effect 
of the conflict, although this was not observed in our first 
birth analysis. One explanation for the lower fertility in the 
Northern Red Sea region could be that the population of this 
region is mostly pastoralist or semi-nomadic. Some studies 
indicate that African pastoral populations have lower fertili-
ty rates than sedentary farming populations or than national 
average (Swift 1977). Swift’s study in Somalia shows that 
pastoral Somali had a lower birth rate (37/1,000 population) 
than settled Somali (56/1,000 population). Another study 
in Senegal also reveals lower fertility for nomadic pastoral 
populations compared to sedentary farming populations 
(Lacombe, Lamy, and Vaugelade 1975). The same reason can 
also be expected to apply in the Northern Red Sea region of 
Eritrea, though further investigation may be needed.
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Table 6:  Relative risks of first birth  associated 
with selected variables, 2002
Model	1 Model	2
Historical	period
Before	1990 0.75*** 0.54***
1990–1992 0.85*** 0.71***
1993–1995 0.94 0.81***
1996–1998 1 1
1999–2001 0.72*** 0.90**
Age	at	first	marriage
<16 – 1
16–19 – 0.61***
≥20 – 0.25***
Spousal	separation
Husband	lives	with	her – 1
Husband	lives	away – 0.94*
Education
No	education – 1
Primary – 1.08**
Secondary	or	higher – 0.91
Childhood	residence
Rural – 1
Urban – 0.90**
Region	of	residence
Southern	Red	Sea – 1
Maekel – 1.05
Northern	Red	Sea – 1.04
Anseba – 1.15***
Gash	Barka – 1.05
Southern – 1.30***
*	p<10%,	**	p<5%,	***	p<1%
Table 7:  Relative risks of higher order births associated with 
selected socio-demographic variables, 2002
Model	1 Model	2
Historical	period
Before	1990 1.17*** 0.98
1990–1992 1.32*** 1.17***
1993–1995 1.30*** 1.23***
1996–1998 1 1
1999–2001 0.74*** 0.76***
Age	at	birth	of	previous	child
<20 – 1
20-24 – 1.09***
25-29 – 1.15***
30-34 – 1.11***
35-39 – 0.91**
40+ – 0.64***
Birth	order
2-3 – 1
4-5 – 0.92***
6-7 – 0.83***
8+ – 0.69***
Survival	status	of	previous	child
Alive 1
Dead 1.27***
Previous	birth	interval	(months)
Less	than	18	 1
18-23 0.92***
24-35 0.90***
36-47 0.79***
48+ 0.73***
Spousal	separation
Husband	lives	with	her – 1
Husband	lives	away – 0.85***
Education
No	education – 1
Primary – 0.89***
Secondary	or	higher – 0.65***
Childhood	residence
Rural – 1
Urban – 0.92**
Region	of	residence
Southern	Red	Sea – 1
Maekel – 0.98
Northern	Red	Sea – 0.92***
Anseba – 1.02
Gash	Barka – 0.93**
Southern – 1.04
*	p<10%,	**	p<5%,	***	p<1%
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To examine more closely whether more affected regions 
exhibit greater fertility response than less affected regions, 
we ran an interaction term between calendar year and 
region of residence (Table 8). The results show that fertility 
declined in all regions during the conflict period and there 
was little difference in the decline between the more af-
fected (Gash Barka and Southern) and less affected regions. 
This is probably because the most affected groups, especial-
ly the displaced groups in the two regions, were excluded 
from the survey, as most of them were living in separate 
camps for internally displaced persons. It is also possible 
that the war was not associated with the fertility change in 
these regions. Research indicates that even if some military 
conflicts are reported to have resulted in short-term fertil-
ity changes, most are not associated with such changes. 
For instance, a study by Agadjanian and Ndola (2002) on 
Angolan fertility indicates that contrary to their expecta-
tions the capital Luanda, which had least direct experience 
of conflict during the civil war, had the strongest fertility 
response, while other regions more affected by the war had 
weak fertility response.
Table 8:  Interaction effects of historical period and region 
of residence on fertility of higher-order births
Region	of	residence
Period
Southern	
Red	Sea
Central
Northern	
Red	Sea
Anseba
Gask	
Barka
Southern
Before	1990 1.07 1.18 1.08 0.98 1.03 0.75
1990–1992 1.24 1.30 1.43 1.20 1.03 1.01
1993–1995 1.17 1.26 1.45 1.27 1.23 1.07
1996–1998 1 1 1 1 1 1
1999–2001 0.66 0.79 0.91 0.79 0.73 0.70
Note:	relative	risks	relative	to	the	period	1996–98.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Our major finding is that the substantial decline in fertil-
ity in Eritrea in the period since the mid-1990s was less the 
result of increased demand for family-size limitation and 
more the result of the border conflict. In other words, the 
conflict is the primary explanation for the observed fertility 
decline, particularly the decline among first births, mainly 
through delayed age at first marriage and spousal separa-
tion. This argument is supported by the finding that when 
these two variables and other socio-demographic factors 
were included in the model, the effect of historical period on 
fertility decreased in both magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance, especially after 1999. In addition, the findings from 
the cross-tabulation analysis show a decline in adolescent 
childbearing from 23 percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 2002. 
However, the effect of historical period still remains strong 
and significant after controlling for other factors, suggesting 
that a substantial part of the period effect is explained by 
other factors that are not included in our analysis (changes 
in per capita income, health, nutrition, etc.). During war 
crises, motivation to reproduce declines due to deterio-
rating economic conditions or declining family income 
(Lesthaeghe 1989). Because of diminishing job opportuni-
ties during periods of war or economic crisis, potential 
parents delay the next birth or terminate childbearing 
(Boserup 1985). Palloni, Hill, and Pinto (1996) also contend 
that since health and nutritional status of pregnant mothers 
deteriorate during crisis periods, an immediate reduction 
in the number of births can be expected to fall still further. 
Psychological stress associated with decline in nutritional 
status or standard of living is also likely to reduce fecundity 
and frequency of intercourse.
Another way of expressing these results is to say that the 
decline in fertility did not come about primarily through 
an increase in contraception or satisfaction of unmet need 
for family planning. Contraception remained constant 
in Eritrea throughout the period 1995 to 2002. Moreover, 
reported fertility preferences, which are considered an 
important factor for fertility change, have changed little. 
The average desired family size remained the same (NSEO 
and ORC Macro 2003) and the proportion of women who 
reported that they want no more children is very low, only 
17 percent, compared with 30–50 percent among women 
in other sub-Saharan African countries that have achieved 
sustained fertility decline (Westoff and Bankole 2002). In 
concrete terms, the decline in fertility was not preceded 
by changes in fertility intentions. Despite Eritrea’s declin-
ing fertility, its unwanted fertility, and the proportion of 
women wanting no more children remained almost con-
stant. This means that the level of unwanted fertility does 
not seem to predict the position Eritrea has in the course 
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of actual fertility transition. These findings challenge the 
hypothesis that fertility preference precedes actual fertil-
ity decline. Since the number of births can decrease due 
to war-induced effects without women desiring to have 
smaller families, it may not always be true that changes 
in fertility preferences will precede the decline in actual 
fertility. The uncertainty of peace may depress the desire 
for children.
Our findings from the analysis of higher order births show 
that the decline did not follow the onset of the conflict 
in 1998. Rather, the decline started in the period between 
1996 and 1998, well before the outbreak of border conflict. 
Thus, the post-1998 decline may partly be an extension of 
a long-term decline that began before 1998 and might have 
continued even without the eruption of the border con-
flict. The finding that the decline occurred among older 
women (35 years or older) and at higher parities (four or 
higher), further corroborates the argument that the decline 
partly indicates the onset of a long-term fertility transi-
tion. Viewed from the sub-Saharan African perspective, 
Eritrea’s fertility decline in terms of higher-order births and 
among older women that occurred before the conflict partly 
reflects the general trend of sub-Saharan Africa. The decline 
in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by a concentration of 
declines at high parities and among older women who have 
achieved or exceeded their desired family size (van de Walle 
and Foster 1990). Similar relationships between fertility 
decline and higher-order births and older women were also 
observed in Latin American countries in the early 1960s 
(Rodriguez and Hobcraft 1980). One important exception 
in the Eritrean case is that the decline occurred without 
any evident reduction in desired family size; this may imply 
that the decline is mainly unintentional and war-induced. 
In particular, the rapid decline during the peak years of the 
border war (1999–2001), suggests that the conflict acceler-
ated the fertility decline of higher-order births. In addition, 
the fall in first births is noticeable only after 1998, which in-
dicates that the decline is mainly an outcome of the border 
conflict. The conflict thus cannot have been neutral in effect 
on the recent fertility decline in Eritrea. 
It can be concluded that Eritrea, with its devastating experi-
ence of thirty years of war for liberation (1961–91) and the 
1998–2000 border conflict, presents an extreme case of 
war-led changes in both socio-economic and demographic 
aspects. Even though Eritrea’s war, the longest in sub-Saha-
ran Africa, is distinctively disastrous, it still offers lessons 
for other African countries that are experiencing similar 
disruption or remain vulnerable to military conflict. The 
Eritrean case allowed us to investigate how demographic 
trends, notably fertility, can be altered or modified by 
military conflict. The inconsistencies of previous studies on 
the effect of war and associated economic crisis on fertility 
prompted the decision to disaggregate by first and higher-
order births and to incorporate all the potential socio-de-
mographic factors that are considered to affect fertility, even 
though the data did not allow us to conduct a more specific 
analysis of time-varying covariates and proximate determi-
nants of fertility. 
Even though this study addresses several important as-
pects and determinants of the recent changes in fertility 
in Eritrea, some questions could not be addressed due to 
the cross-sectional nature of the data. For instance, data 
limitation prevented further analysis of the effects of socio-
economic status, both at individual level and macro-level 
in different areas of the country. Changes in such economic 
indicators may affect fertility differently in different peri-
ods. But even with these limitations our analysis proved suf-
ficient to supply informative inferences. First, as expected, 
we found a lower probability of first birth during wartime, 
both during the peak years of the war of independence 
(before 1992) and during the border conflict (1999–2001) 
and a rebound in the periods of peace and political stabil-
ity (1993–1998). Second, the decline in higher-order births 
started before the conflict, but accelerated during and after 
the conflict.
Finally, the cross-sectional analysis of fertility and its de-
terminants does not enable any sound predictions of future 
trends in fertility to be made. In general, with the data used 
in this study, any attempt to extrapolate the differences 
discovered between the periods before and after the conflict 
would be highly speculative, especially because the politi-
cal situation remains volatile and the 1998–2000 border 
conflict is still unresolved and further complicates the 
country’s demographic situation. Studies suggest that war-
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related short-term swings in fertility are easily detectable, 
but long-term effects of war- or crisis-induced distress are 
more complex to establish (Lindstrom and Berhanu 1999). 
Nevertheless, although we have no reason to think that the 
border conflict has caused lasting change in Eritrea’s fertil-
ity, it is plausible to conclude that it has a clear short-term 
impact across different socio-economic segments of the 
population, particularly in terms of first-birth fertility, and 
that these variations are likely to mark the course of future 
demographic transition. 
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